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On 12 December 2013, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
published an open letter to Valerie Amos, United Nations
(UN) Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator.1 The letter was issued
after months of bilateral advocacy by MSF towards UN
humanitarian agencies and other NGOs to increase their
emergency response to the crisis in the Central African
Republic (CAR).
The March 2013 coup d’etat in CAR had brought to
power a military alliance of rebel groups known as the
Seleka, and the months that followed were ﬁlled with
violence. The Seleka mainly, but not exclusively, targeted
the majority Christian population, abusing and killing civ-
ilians in a bid to control the country. By the summer,
self-defence militias called AntiBalaka had organised
themselves locally to rid their villages and towns of the
Seleka, and started to attack Muslim communities who
they viewed as in league with the new regime. Following
gruesome violence perpetrated by both the Seleka and
the AntiBalaka, rural villages were abandoned and over
400,000 people were displaced, leaving only the bigger
cities inhabited.
The CAR population had known decades of low-inten-
sity conﬂict, but the level of fear gripping the country in
2013 was unprecedented. It culminated on 5 December
with a coordinated attack by the AntiBalaka on the capi-
tal, Bangui. The arrival of French troops to disarm the
Seleka led to a power vacuum, the result of which was
bloodshed. President Michel Djotodia was pressured into
stepping down in January 2014, and attacks on Muslims
followed by revenge killings against Christians took place
around the country as the ex-Seleka withdrew from Ban-
gui. The AntiBalaka increased the number of attacks
against Muslim communities in the North and West of
the country, and what had started as a ﬁght against the
Seleka was now directed at all Muslims. The AntiBalaka
took it upon themselves to ‘clean up the country’, rid-
ding it of people they perceived as foreigners while also
attacking convoys of displaced Muslims along the roads
to Northern CAR and violently pillaging Bangui’s Christian
quarters in a general atmosphere of impunity and law-
lessness.
Despite the extreme level of violence and displace-
ment experienced by the people living in CAR, their situ-
ation went largely unnoticed by international politicians
and the media in 2013. This was what prompted MSF to
raise the country’s proﬁle through its public communica-
tions as of July of that year. Repeated rounds of meet-
ings with UN ofﬁcials across ﬁeld locations in CAR and
in the UN ofﬁces in Geneva and New York had not
yielded tangible results, explaining the public call for
action. Months after MSF urged the UN to reinforce its
capacity on the ground what has changed?
The violence in CAR reached its peak between Decem-
ber 2013 and January 2014, when the clashes between
the Seleka and the AntiBalaka were at their worst. It
should, however, be noted that the violence levels
recorded since March 2014 are still signiﬁcantly higher
than those from before March 2013. The attacks have
mainly been concentrated in areas where there are Mus-
lim enclaves, such as the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui,
and also along the evolving frontline between the two
zones of control, which runs from Ouham-Pende to the
towns of Bambari and Grimari in Ouaka. The current
violence includes the targeting of civilians seen as pro-
AntiBalaka in areas controlled by the Seleka, criminal vio-
lence by certain AntiBalaka members targeting everyone
in areas under their control, and long-running conﬂicts
between sedentary agriculturalists (mostly Christians) and
armed (Muslim) Peuhl pastoralists.
There are two main reasons for the decline in violence.
One is that the Seleka and most of the Muslim popula-
tion have either withdrawn or been driven out from Anti-
Balaka-controlled areas and there are therefore fewer
people to target. The second is the presence of interna-
tional troops. In general, whenever international forces
arrive in an area, the levels of violence drop. For exam-
ple, in February in Carnot, the AntiBalaka descended on
the town as soon as the Seleka withdrew; the four days
of violence that followed only ended with the arrival of
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UN-mandated and African Union-led Mission Internatio-
nale de Soutien a la Centrafrique (MISCA) soldiers.
Yet, the reduction in the levels of violence has not
necessarily made it safer for humanitarians to operate in
the country, and risks for aid workers at ﬁeld level have
increased in some areas. Much of Bangui, certain towns
and some roads are relatively safe for humanitarian
workers, though this in large part depends on the pres-
ence or absence of belligerents and international military
forces. Those areas adjoining the new frontline between
Ouham-Pende and Ouaka have become more dangerous,
as this is where the violence has moved to. Some areas
have become a ‘no man’s land’ where several armed
groups can operate without interference and where
humanitarian organisations can only work at considerable
risk to their staff.
The humanitarian community has made visible efforts
to increase the work being done in CAR, but the results
for the population have so far been uneven. In Decem-
ber 2013, the situation was declared a ‘level 3 emer-
gency’ and this resulted in a short-term surge of
experienced UN international staff arriving in the coun-
try. UN agencies and interna-
tional NGOs (INGOs) have
since expanded their previ-
ously very weak ﬁeld presence:
the number of humanitarian
workers outside Bangui has
more than doubled. However,
while it is easy to see the
increased input, it has been
harder to observe meaningful results. Overall, there
have been some piecemeal achievements in the deliv-
ery of humanitarian assistance and we are far from a
situation of ‘unacceptable performance’ as was
described in the December 2013 open letter, but much
more still needs to be done.
While the increased assistance and protection
remains too little and has come too late and without a
sense of urgency or obligation, humanitarian aid has
contributed to the stabilisation of the situation, at least
in some hard-hit areas. However, in a statement on 1
June, six months after the level 3 declaration, the UN’s
Humanitarian Coordinator said of the internally dis-
placed people (IDP) camps in Bangui: ‘I am deeply
shocked to see so many people still living in terrible
conditions.’ This is in reference to the easiest to reach
target population in the country. What does that then
say about the situation of those living in more remote
areas? The sad reality is that the coverage of humani-
tarian needs across the country remains insufﬁcient,
particularly outside the cities, leading to a high number
of preventable deaths. The emergency response in CAR
continues to require an urgent scale-up in line with the
assistance gaps that only reinforce the vulnerability of
communities looking to start their life over with a mini-
mum of sustainability.
The number of displaced people in CAR has declined
in recent months, but this does not mean that the emer-
gency phase is over. Instead, what we are now seeing
is the re-emergence of CAR’s long-term ‘chronic
emergency’, but at a more serious and more debilitating
level. While humanitarian efforts have up until now been
largely concentrated on cities and towns, it is in rural vil-
lages that vulnerable populations are suffering the most.
Hundreds of thousands of people are returning to their
homes with next to nothing – and are still receiving very
little humanitarian assistance.
In terms of health, we are only just beginning to see
the medium-term consequences of the violence and dis-
placement experienced by the people of CAR over the
last year and a half. The population is in a severely weak-
ened state of health and what health system was in
place has now collapsed. Many CAR Muslims who were
forced to ﬂee to Chad and Cameroon are still facing a
severe lack of assistance. Inside CAR, access to health
care remains disastrous, especially outside the major
towns and cities. The malaria
season, which has already
started, seems likely to result in
a high number of serious cases
given the increased exposure
of the population, who spent
months sheltering in the bush.
Food insecurity is also mount-
ing, and will have signiﬁcant
direct and indirect effects on the population’s precarious
health conditions with malnutrition rates growing at
alarming rates and much faster than in previous years.
The international community has been largely indiffer-
ent to the situation in CAR, and political and humanitar-
ian responses to the crisis continue to be slow. The
guarded sense of optimism that a foreign military inter-
vention and an increase in the provision of humanitarian
aid would reduce the violence and lead to better protec-
tion for traumatised civilians has been dashed by the
realities of the last few months: violence has moved to
the more peripheral areas of the country but levels
remain high. Towns across the North and West of the
country have been largely emptied of their Muslim popu-
lations in a campaign akin to ethnic cleansing, something
which was witnessed with anguish and a sense of power-
lessness by MSF teams.
As yet, there has not been much discussion about the
effect the UN-mandated MINUSCA (Mission Integree des
Nations-Unies pour la Stabilisation de la Centrafrique)
mission will have on the protection of civilians and on
the overall security in CAR, including on the timely deliv-
ery of assistance by the humanitarian community. The
MINUSCA launch in September 2014 is already having a
‘The longer-term prognosis for CAR is very
grim and the situation can perhaps best be
described as a triple crisis, linking humani-
tarian needs, development and protection.
All three individually require a viable reso-
lution before any can be fixed.’
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signiﬁcant impact on whatever humanitarians being are
perceived as impartial and neutral by the civilian popula-
tion and armed groups, especially as aid agencies
request and receive MINUSCA armed protection. How
MINUSCA handles the interplay of humanitarian assis-
tance with the political requirements of supporting the
rebuilding of a (nonfunctioning) state and developing its
capacities will have far-reaching consequences as recent
acts of violence targeting UN peacekeepers is clearly
showing. MINUSCA and the rising number of aid agen-
cies are also likely to use up much of the already weak
and strained logistic and human resource capacity of the
country, compounding its development and governance
constraints.
The longer-term prognosis for CAR is very grim and
the situation can perhaps best be described as a triple
crisis, linking humanitarian needs, the country’s govern-
ance to ensure long-term development and protection.
All three individually require a viable resolution before
any can be ﬁxed. While humanitarians cannot be
expected to solve the complexity of CAR’s societal deteri-
oration on their own, and different actors will need to
take on the challenges of each crisis in a concerted man-
ner with all stakeholders, the crisis is far from being over
and more must be done in the coming months to avoid
an even more acute disaster.
Note
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